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This study proposes the need for secure remote communications to protect the data and 
information infrastructure of an organization.  Several common remote access 
technologies are discussed, along with their various flaws and strengths.  End-to-end 
encrypted VPN tunnels appear to be the most secure method of remote network access, 
and are discussed in terms of their performance and implementation details.   
 
A performance test for a VPN tunnel was performed to highlight the differences in 
network latency and throughput when additional levels of security are added.  
Cryptographic functions like hashing and Perfect Forward Secrecy are discussed and 
compared along with different cryptographic algorithms like DES and 3DES.  Ultimately, 
the differences in performance between cryptographic configurations are slight, though 
could be amplified by network conditions. 
 
 
 
Headings: 
 
Computer Networks – Encryption 
 
Computer Networks – Virtual Private Networks 
 
Computer Networks – Remote Access
CHOOSING SECURE REMOTE ACCESS TECHNOLOGIES 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Jeffrey B. Bollinger 
 
 
A Master’s paper submitted to the faculty 
of the School of Information and Library Science 
of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Science in 
Information Science. 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 
November 2004  
Approved by 
_______________________________________ 
Diane Kelly
 1
 
Controlling access to networked systems is critical to preserving data integrity and 
stability for business functions. The purpose of this study is to evaluate several common 
methods for secure remote network access to organizational data to determine their 
suitability for different applications in their business and security context.     
Since the most secure system is one that is not powered on, security must be 
defined by the organization implementing the safeguards.  A careful balance must be 
maintained between a system’s usability versus its security.  The goal of a computer 
system is to perform mundane and repetitive tasks to manipulate information.  Installing 
overly complex security technologies detracts from the ability of systems and users to 
accomplish tasks in an efficient manner.  It is important that the information workers in 
an organization can accomplish the same job they were able to do before implementing a 
secure remote access method.  The ultimate goal is stable or increased productivity while 
ensuring that communications are securely transmitted.  With advanced network security 
technologies, the addition of layers of latency and complexity are almost unavoidable.  
Encryption always costs more CPU cycles and network bandwidth than transmitting 
information in clear text.  An organization needs to evaluate a secure access methodology 
by weighing the factors of performance and total cost.     
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Modern secure remote access methods may use a combination of access controls, 
specialized network protocols, varying strengths of encryption keys and algorithms, and 
logging to ensure reliable and secure communications.  Each technology adds layers of 
security to the data transmission process.  While no individual technology is completely 
secure by itself, the combination of several protocols and access methods and protections 
can provide a comprehensive approach to data security.   
Defining acceptable security stands as the first goal to establishing an effective 
remote access policy and the subsequent selection of security technologies.  Security 
must be applied in the context where it is most appropriate.  The level of protection for 
data like financial information, law enforcement/military communication, or a private 
company or individual’s intellectual property is self-defined in the context of the nature 
of the data.  Susan Pancho describes the atomics of a security context when defining an 
encompassing security protocol. She writes,  
“The security context of an authentication protocol is defined by the sum 
of its components: goals it seeks to attain, assumptions that define the 
application environment the protocol was designed for, messages 
describing how participants interact, and the checks that participants 
perform within the course of the protocol.  Any analysis of a protocol 
relies on an interpretation of its security context.” (Pancho, 1999)  
 
Of course each organization can make its own business case, or goals in Pancho’s model, 
for their acceptable level of security; however to define “secure” for a broad range of 
applications and business needs, we can assume that effective security for data and 
information transfer must contain at least the concepts, or assumptions of confidentiality, 
integrity, and non-repudiation.  While these assumptions themselves cannot be 
quantitatively measured, it is prudent to establish them as a basis for any major business 
decision with regards to a network security protocol implementation.  Pancho reinforces 
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this notion when she writes, “Assumptions define the application environment for which 
the protocol was designed for.  Assumptions are important because they do not only 
describe a protocol's environment, they also define its limitations.” (Pancho, 1999) 
 
The next section will highlight the need to establish the security context assumptions and 
will define a basic approach for an acceptable baseline level of security.  Following this 
section will be a description of common remote and network access methods along with 
their strengths and weaknesses.  Finally, a solution to secure access is proposed and is 
followed by performance measurement comparisons to see which solution or 
implementation can provide the greatest security at the highest level of performance. 
 
 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Non-Repudiation 
 
Confidentiality is important for communications that require secrecy and protection from 
exposure to an unauthorized external party.  A remote access technology that purports to 
provide clandestine communications between at least two parties should ensure that it is 
either extremely difficult or impossible to derive the protected information from 
information that may already exist on the network.  A good example would be public key 
cryptography, where each user has a public and a private encryption key.  User A makes 
their public key available to any recipients.  The recipients then use user A’s public key 
to encrypt a message that only user A can read.  User A must then use their private key, 
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known only to them to decrypt the message that was encrypted with their publicly 
available public key.  It is mathematically impossible for anyone to deduce or compute 
user A’s private key with only the data in their public key.  Encryption is the only true 
method to ensure the confidentiality of data since it transforms human readable 
information (clear text) into an unreadable form (ciphertext) and provides a method for 
deriving the original and intended message.  The issue with encryption is how to deal 
with the added latency of the crypto process.   This can be a major factor when 
considering very slow, or asymmetric network links like those of satellite 
communications.  A network signal originating from a PC on Earth must be relayed 
through the airwaves to a satellite which then bounces the signal to other satellites and 
eventually back down to Earth where the transmission is received and converted to a 
format that is passable on copper or fiber optic lines.  This increased distance adds a 
latency that may or may not be significant or noticeable to the PC user.  However the 
addition of encryption information to the total size of the original packet, particularly 
with protocols like IPSec, increases the latency experienced by the data packet.   
The fact that a message is impossible to read does not mean that the information 
transfer between two parties has not been modified.  Encryption alone does not guarantee 
that the original message sent from a source is the exact message that is received by the 
destination.  If an attacker is able to somehow intercept, steal, or derive the private 
(secret) key, then communications can be tampered with or originated from the attacker.  
The destination will receive the information encrypted with what they believe to be the 
secret key of their trusted sender.  Therefore, to satisfy the basic requirements of effective 
secure remote communication, a system must provide some method or methods to ensure 
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the integrity of the information. Integrity is essential for secure remote data 
communication.  A transfer is useless if the data has been modified or tampered with 
during its transmission.  Logically, the purpose of the transfer was to move specific data 
from source A to destination B.  A expects and intends that B will receive the data in its 
original form just as B expects the data from A to be legitimate and intentional.  The 
criticality of integrity is amplified within certain security contexts.  For example, the 
interception and injection of false information into a company’s publicly posted annual 
report could be a catastrophe for the management, employees, and shareholders.  The 
need for integrity becomes obvious as the magnitude of potential calamity increases.  
 One methodology for maintaining or at least guaranteeing the integrity of data is 
known as hashing.  A hash is a mathematical representation of a given string of data.  
Complex algorithms are used to convert a string of a data to a fixed-length and unique 
form that can be verified by the receiver.  If one bit in a selection of data is changed, the 
hashes will be vastly different.  A common method is to hash information with a private 
key that is known by both the source and the destination.  The source hashes the 
information and the receiver can verify that the hash is the same by applying the known 
private key, or shared secret.  A hash must be “one-way” and is only effective if it cannot 
be reversed to reveal the underlying data.  The receiver can verify the hash of the 
sender’s message to ensure that it has not changed in transit thereby providing assurance 
that the integrity of the message has been retained. 
Even if critical information is encrypted to provide confidentiality and hashed to 
ensure its integrity, the receiver must be able to ensure that the message actually came 
from the intended sender and that the message was not redirected or sent under a false 
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identity.  Non-repudiation of the message ensures that the sender actually sent the 
message received by the destination.  The sender cannot deny that the message originated 
from their system, which infers that the only person who could have sent a message 
would be the sender.  Non-repudiation confirms the authenticity and integrity of the 
sender rather than the transmitted information itself.  A certain type of hashing known as 
Hashed Message Authentication Code, or HMAC, can provide non-repudiation through 
authentication.  Michael Wenstrom explains the HMAC and its role in providing integrity 
and non-repudiation,  
Hashing algorithms have evolved into HMACs, which combine the proven 
security of hashing algorithms with additional cryptographic functions.  
The hash produced is encrypted with the sender’s private key, resulting in 
a keyed checksum as output…The hash function takes as input a private 
key and the variable-length cleartext data that needs to be authenticated.  
The private key length is the same as the hash’s output.  The HMAC 
algorithm is run with a resultant fixed-length checksum as output.  This 
checksum value is sent with the message as a signature.  The receiving 
peer runs an HMAC on the same message data that was input at the 
sender, using the same private key, and the resultant hash is compared 
with the received hash, which should match exactly. 
 
Data integrity and data origin authentication depend on the secrecy of the 
secret key.  If only the sender and receiver know the key and the HMAC is 
correct, this proves that the message must have been sent by the sender.” 
(Wenstrom, 2001)  
Although it is more complicated to achieve than the other basic security requirements, the 
principles of authentication exist to improve the possibility of true non-repudiation.   
Next to encryption, authentication is fundamental to a secure remote access 
system.  Authentication proves to the system that the information worker attempting to 
transmit data is who they claim to be.  Many methodologies exist in either one or a 
combination of: what you know (e.g. password, passphrase, or PIN number), what you 
have (e.g. token, Smart card, or key), or what you are (e.g. biometric information like 
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retina or iris maps, fingerprints, or facial recognition.)  The more required factors, the 
more difficult it is to fake or assume an identity.  The method or methods of 
authentication are pivotal to the overall security of a system since they are often the 
weakest link in the chain of security.  The most expensive, complex, and secure remote 
access system can easily be thwarted if an attacker guesses or somehow derives a user 
password.  
 
 
 
Down to the Wire 
 
There are numerous media and methodologies for passing network traffic.  From satellite 
to dial-up phone lines, to high speed broadband cable, data packets can traverse a 
multitude of technologies.  Yet whenever data is transmitted from a source to a receiver, 
there is always the possibility of interception or tampering.  Generally, the more 
accessible the medium is to the attacker, the more likely the chances of data interception.  
For this reason, security protocols have been created to enable a secure transport of data. 
Dial-up communications were one of the first methodologies for widespread LAN 
and WAN access.  An end user must initiate a call, typically over an analog phone line to 
a remote site that processes a credential and provides access to a remote network or other 
remote resource.  An authentication server can be used if there are multiple clients 
connecting to the same remote network.  To offset the processing resources used by the 
Network Access Server (NAS), an authentication server can be used to process only 
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authentication requests.  The client connects to the NAS and the NAS challenges the 
client for authentication (e.g. username and password).  The user responds to the 
challenge, passing its credentials to the NAS.  The NAS forwards the response to the 
authentication server which confirms or denies access by informing the NAS of the 
authentication state: passed or failed.   
 
 
 
Dial-up connections typically use two major protocols for the connections: SLIP and 
PPP.  The most predominant is PPP (Steinke, 2000.) RFC 1661 defines PPP:  
“The Point-to-Point Protocol is designed for simple links which transport packets 
between two peers.  These links provide full-duplex simultaneous bi-directional 
operation, and are assumed to deliver packets in order.  It is intended that PPP 
provide a common solution for easy connection of a wide variety of hosts, bridges 
and routers.” (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1661.txt) 
 
The encapsulation of packets with different network layer protocols makes it possible to 
pass diverse traffic across Internet links to remote sites.  Because SLIP does not provide 
for authentication or encryption, and because it does not provide the ability to transport 
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anything other than IP traffic, its discussion as an effective transmission protocol of 
secure communications is irrelevant.  To address the most basic component to secure 
transmission, PPP contains an “Authentication Protocol” bit in the protocol field of the 
packet header.  The RFC indicates that this field allows for the negotiation between two 
different types of authentication protocols:   
“The Authentication-Protocol field is two octets, and indicates the 
authentication protocol desired.  Values for this field are always the same 
as the PPP Protocol field values for that same authentication protocol. 
 
Up-to-date values of the Authentication-Protocol field are specified in the 
most recent "Assigned Numbers" RFC [2].  Current values are assigned as 
follows: 
 
        Value (in hex)  Protocol 
 
c023            Password Authentication Protocol 
        c223            Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol” 
 
In its native state, a remote user can use PPP to connect and authenticate to a remote 
network using either Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) or Challenge Handshake 
Authentication Protocol (CHAP).  The strength of the security lies in the power and 
flexibility of the authentication protocol.  The RFCs have not built encryption, hashing, 
or other techniques into PPP that would address the assumptions of confidentiality, 
integrity, and non-repudiation.   The most rudimentary form of security comes with the 
challenges available from either PAP or CHAP.   
 
RFC 1334 indicates that PAP,  
“…provides a simple method for the peer to establish its identity using a 2-way 
handshake.  This is done only upon initial link establishment. After the Link 
Establishment phase is complete, an Id/Password pair is repeatedly sent by the 
peer to the authenticator until authentication is acknowledged or the connection is 
terminated.” (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1334.txt) 
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This challenge response is one of the simplest designs: 
 
 
However the RFC indicates that PAP is not a robust and secure method for connecting to 
a remote network.  Specifically, “PAP is not a strong authentication method.  Passwords 
are sent over the circuit "in the clear", and there is no protection from playback or 
repeated trial and error attacks.  The peer is in control of the frequency and timing of the 
attempts.” 
Because authentication data flows in clear-text, it is trivial for an attacker to 
intercept the communication and have the exact information that crossed the dial-up 
lines.  There is no encryption built-in to the protocol; therefore PAP is not a useful 
methodology for transmitting data securely.  Information sent without encryption is like 
sending a postcard through the postal service.  The card can pass from a source to a 
destination, but any party in between can read the message written on the back.  If an 
attacker can intercept the login credentials of a remote user, they can then use the same 
credentials to access the remote network under the guise of the original user.  The remote 
network cannot differentiate between the incoming clients as the NAS and authentication 
server only see and process the credentials.  Therefore, the privileges assigned to the 
client upon connection to the network are transferred to the attacker as well. 
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The need for encryption is obvious, and although not encryption in the truest sense, one 
methodology for maintaining the integrity of the login session via PPP is through the 
Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP).    Per RFC 1334,  
“The Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) is used to 
periodically verify the identity of the peer using a 3-way handshake.  This is done 
upon initial link establishment, and MAY be repeated anytime after the link has 
been established. 
 
After the Link Establishment phase is complete, the authenticator sends a 
"challenge" message to the peer.  The peer responds with a value calculated using 
a "one-way hash" function.  The authenticator checks the response against its own 
calculation of the expected hash value.  If the values match, the authentication is 
acknowledged; otherwise the connection SHOULD be terminated. 
 
CHAP provides protection against playback attack through the use of an 
incrementally changing identifier and a variable challenge value. The use of 
repeated challenges is intended to limit the time of exposure to any single attack.  
The authenticator is in control of the frequency and timing of the challenges. 
 
This authentication method depends upon a "secret" known only to the 
authenticator and that peer.  The secret is not sent over the link. This method is 
most likely used where the same secret is easily accessed from both ends of the 
link.” (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1334.txt) 
 
The hashing function of CHAP provides the integrity of the end user’s response to the 
NAS’ challenge.  Although an attacker may be able to intercept the communication 
between the client and the NAS, the attacker cannot calculate the hash that the NAS 
expects to receive since the hash is based on a variable challenge string that changes 
periodically throughout the communication session.  Even if the attacker were to 
somehow calculate the proper response to the challenge, they would not be able to 
maintain the communication since the NAS periodically re-issues the challenge at 
unpredictable intervals.  CHAP’s three-way handshake provides a hashing function that 
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protects the integrity of the transmission along with the confidentiality of the end user’s 
identifier and password.   
 
 
 
However, there is a major flaw with CHAP in that the client’s response to the NAS’ 
challenge must be stored in clear-text on the NAS or authentication server.  If the 
authentication server is somehow compromised by an external attacker, the 
secret/password for every end-user can be easily retrieved or modified.  While only a 
hashed value of the end-user’s secret crosses the PPP link and not the actual password 
itself, the storage of the password in clear-text can be a major problem as both internal 
employees and attackers who can successfully compromise the authentication server can 
easily see the credentials, thereby diminishing the overall security posture of the 
organization.  An exposed password is just as worthless as no password at all.      
Since PPP is the most widely used and adaptable dial-up remote access protocol, 
additional measures must be taken to effectively secure its communications from 
espionage or tampering.  Confidentiality and integrity are minimally addressed by CHAP, 
though the user’s password is stored in clear-text and only the authentication session has 
any real security.  The rest of the communications between the client and the NAS are 
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left unencrypted.  Even if an attacker cannot garner the client’s password, it is still 
possible to recover data transmitted across the wire in clear-text.  Since one of the pre-
defined goals for any reasonable security policy is to prevent the exposure of company 
data, PPP/dial-up alone does not serve as an appropriately secure communication 
methodology.  Even in terms of performance, dial-up cannot offer the speeds of other 
remote transmission media and PPP is either unsuitable or incompatible with other 
common methods of remote communication.   
 
 
 
 Encryption Protocols Authentication Protocols 
Dial-Up IPSec PAP, CHAP, MS-CHAP, 
EAP 
Ethernet/LAN IPSec EAP, EAP-TLS, 802.1x 
Wireless WEP, WPA, 802.11i EAP, LEAP, EAP-FAST, 
EAP-TLS, 802.1x 
VPN IPSec, IKE Xauth, 802.1x, EAP-TLS 
Table 1 
Through the Ether 
 
Specified in the IEEE 802.3 standard, Ethernet is the local area network (LAN) suite of 
standards that define the physical and data-link layers of the Open Systems Interconnect 
(OSI) Seven-Layer Model.  The OSI model provides for the ability of various and diverse 
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remote networks to communicate with each other using a layering and encapsulation/de-
capsulation methodology.   
 
 
 
 
Each layer is added or removed depending on the cardinality of the traffic flow.  An 
application takes its information and packages it into a format recognizable by the 
Presentation layer which then adds its own information if necessary and passes the data 
down to the Session layer, until the packet reaches the physical layer where it is 
converted to a series of electrical pulses before it is sent down the wire.  The receiver 
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then picks up the electrical pulses and passes that up the Data-Link layer where the pulses 
are interpreted and, if necessary, modified and passed up to the network layer, etc.   
Ethernet specifies the requirements for the IEEE standard number 802.3. This 
only takes into consideration the bottom two layers.  However, Ethernet encompasses the 
vast majority of modern LAN designs.  Understanding how Ethernet works can give the 
protocol designer an advantage in creating a secure methodology.  Foundational to 
Ethernet is the notion of Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Detection (CSMA/CD).  
This means that before a client PC transmits data across a LAN, it will first “listen” to see 
if other traffic is being transmitted.  Based on various algorithms, the Ethernet standard 
then calls for the client to transmit its data frames and refrain from sending if a 
“collision” between two frames on the wire occurs (Almes & Lazowska, 1979).   
Similar to how PPP defines the protocol through which dial-up traffic travels; 
Ethernet defines the transmission method that local area network traffic traverses.  
Because Ethernet uses broadcasts and a shared physical medium, it is much easier for an 
attacker to intercept data across a LAN segment.  If an attacker is on the same network as 
the sender, the attacker can simply “listen” in on the segment to see the data crossing the 
wire.  Therefore it is imperative to protect the local communication to increase the 
security and guarantee the assumptions needed for remote communications.  However, 
because Ethernet alone only defines the two lowest layers of the OSI model, technologies 
like encryption cannot be discussed as they typically occur at either the Session or 
Application layers.  Nevertheless, newer variations and additions to Ethernet do provide 
for non-repudiation. 
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802.1x is the IEEE specification that allows a PC to be identified based on its own 
unique network identifier.  Ethernet requires that hosts communicating through a 
Network Interface Card (NIC) have a distinctive 48-bit Media Access Control (MAC) 
address to identify the source and destinations of networked traffic.  802.1x allows a 
network to use the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to authenticate a user’s PC 
rather than the individual users themselves.   
Fundamentally, a user connects their PC to the network and powers it on.  The 
network card then receives a special packet using any number of EAP types.  The packet 
is received by the network switch port and is matched against a known table of hashes for 
the MAC address of the user’s network card.  The network switch then decides how to 
process the connection based on the computer’s response to the initial EAP packet.  
In combination with a password and an encrypted authentication session, this 
technique can satisfy the assumptions about secure communications.  The main issue is 
that 802.1x is useful for local communications and not necessarily for remote transaction 
where network traffic crosses through unprotected and unmonitored links through the 
Internet.  Once the network traffic leaves the corporate LAN, it is vulnerable to any 
attacker on the Internet.     
The security of the local area network must be another assumption imposed on the 
attempt at secure remote access.  If the LAN is not secured, then there is no guarantee 
that remote connections are protected.  Since the integrity of remote communications 
depend on the destination receiving the exact data that was originated by the sender, the 
protection of the LAN is paramount to protecting the initial flow of information.  
However because of the incalculable methodologies and different variables in each 
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instance of a local area network, the security of the source and destination LANs and 
their internal communications are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Transmission Control 
 
While PPP specifies the predominant protocol for dial-up communications, more modern 
methods of remote access have been developed to account for the greater demand for 
high speed connectivity.  However, the ability of an attacker to gather private data is 
proportional to the speed at which the data can be transmitted.  There are many methods 
and protocols to move data rapidly from one network to another using technology like 
ATM, ISDN, Frame Relay, and broadband cable.  Yet regardless of the medium or 
methodology for transmitting frames of data, TCP/IP has become the de-facto standard 
for most applications that utilize the computer network. 
TCP/IP is the combination of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the 
Internet Protocol (IP).  TCP is a layer four protocol responsible for ensuring that data 
packets arrive undamaged and in the correct order.  IP is the predominant layer three 
protocol that prepares and encapsulates data for remote transmission.  By themselves, 
TCP and IP offer little in regards to network security.  TCP performs a three-way 
handshake similar to the methodology used by CHAP.  This handshake attempts to 
ensure that the sender and receiver are synchronized and ready to transmit data to each 
other.  There are built-in components to the TCP header that provide a sequencing 
schema for the packets so that the receiver can properly re-assemble them should they 
arrive in the incorrect order.  These “sequence numbers” make it more difficult for an 
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attacker to guess the next number that a packet will take.  Per the RFC 793 that defines 
the Transmission Control Protocol,  
“The TCP must recover from data that is damaged, lost, duplicated, or 
delivered out of order by the internet communication system.  This is 
achieved by assigning a sequence number to each octet transmitted, and 
requiring a positive acknowledgment (ACK) from the receiving TCP.  If 
the ACK is not received within a timeout interval, the data is 
retransmitted.  At the receiver, the sequence numbers are used to correctly 
order segments that may be received out of order and to eliminate 
duplicates.  Damage is handled by adding a checksum to each segment 
transmitted, checking it at the receiver, and discarding damaged segments. 
If attackers are able to predict the sequence number of a packet, they can 
then fake, or spoof the number of their own packet and have the sender 
respond to them. “(ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc793.txt) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Since all TCP traffic responds to a new communication request with an ACK, the 
attacker can receive the ACK, spoof the next sequence number and intercept 
communications from the source.  The attacker can also do damage by reflecting the 
response packets to a victim to flood their connection and prevent any communication 
from occurring.  This type of attack known as a denial of service (DoS) can significantly 
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disrupt business communications and instantly reduce network productivity to zero.  Vern 
Paxon describes the danger of this inherent TCP behavior in his description of a DoS 
attack amplified by an attack and dozens of reflectors (slaves):   
“TCP-based servers running on TCP stacks with guessable sequence 
numbers are a severe threat. Not only do they allow application-level 
reflection without easy identification of the slave (unless the precursor 
traffic probing the sequence-number progression is logged), but they also 
can provide major amplification of the attack traffic due to the use of 
ACK-splitting techniques (2001).” 
 
So by its nature, some TCP implementations themselves can be used to provide attackers 
and data snoopers with information gleaned from remote communications.  RFC 793 
again points out that, “An acknowledgment by TCP does not guarantee that the data has 
been delivered to the end user, but only that the receiving TCP has taken the 
responsibility to do so.” (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc793.txt) 
Integrity is not guaranteed since the source cannot verify that the packet they sent 
was the same received by the destination since the sequence number could have been 
spoofed, and a new packet forged by the attacker.  Confidentiality is again not addressed 
since these packets can be captured and the payloads can be examined in clear-text.  TCP 
does attempt to address non-repudiation with the three-way handshake model, but 
because there is no guarantee that the receiver is getting data from the presumptive 
sender, non-repudiation cannot be assured.   
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Virtually Private 
So with the impossibility of useful secrecy in dial-up and broadband, and the inability to 
natively protect remote communications with the most common protocols, some form of 
useful transport level encryption must be employed to satisfy the assumptions of effective 
security.  As has been established, encryption in conjunction with hashing can satisfy the 
three assumptions demanded by the most basic levels of remote communication security.  
Users on one LAN need to be able to communicate with users on another LAN securely, 
while having the guarantee of confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation.  Just as a 
local private LAN must be tightly secured to ensure that remote communications will be 
protected, there is a need to expand the security in the private network between two 
different (either geographically or logically) and remote networks.   
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a methodology for accomplishing this remote 
communication safely.  A VPN establishes a secure tunnel between two networks.  
Typically, a VPN is the tunnel between two outward facing endpoints of a LAN.  All the 
traffic passing through the tunnel is encapsulated with a security protocol or is encrypted.   
 
 
 
This type of technology provides end-to-end encryption for network traffic that would 
normally cross between networks in clear-text.  The need for a VPN to ensure secure 
remote communications is obvious, but with any major business decision the factors of 
 21
scalability, cost, and performance play a large role in determining the ultimate choice of a 
security technology. 
A dominant factor is maintaining the network bandwidth as much as possible 
between the two sites.  Each time encryption is added to the traffic flow, the latency of 
the network increases and data transmission can slow down.  So, a VPN satisfies the 
requirements of secure remote access, but at what cost to the speed of data transmission?  
The rate of network traffic flow is increasingly important for businesses that demand 
real-time transactions of their data.  A stock broker’s office must have near instantaneous 
communication to its service provider and the financial markets to ensure that a trade 
goes through as soon as it has been initiated.  The same could be said for a doctor 
performing remote surgery using a video feed and remote surgical tools over the Internet.  
Because of the demand for high speed performance, an organization choosing a VPN or a 
particular configuration in a VPN implementation must consider the options available. 
The stronger the level of encryption, the longer it will take for the packet to be 
encoded and subsequently decoded.  There are also other factors to consider when 
choosing an encryption protocol.  The two major types of encryption are Private Key 
cryptography (Symmetric encryption) and Public Key cryptography (Asymmetric 
encryption).  Private Key cryptography is cryptography in its most classical sense.  User 
A has a secret key that encrypts message A1.  User A then transmits message A1 to User 
B, who uses the same shared secret key to decode the message.  The problem with this 
approach is that there must be a guaranteed secure way to transmit the secret key without 
its interception or modification.  There is also the possibility than an attack can guess the 
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secret key and can thereby intercept and decode the encrypted traffic. The key exchange 
is the problem for secure transmission.   
In 1976 Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman created a method to securely 
exchange encryption keys without having to secure the transmission channel of the secret 
key.  Their method forms a large component of Public Key cryptography.  They write,  
“We now suggest a new public key distribution system which has several 
advantages. First, it requires only one ‘‘key’’ to be exchanged. Second, the 
cryptanalytic effort bears to grow exponentially in the effort of the 
legitimate users. And, third, its use can be tied to a public file of user 
information which serves to authenticate user A to user B vice versa. By 
making the public file essentially a read memory, one personal appearance 
allows a user to authenticate his identity many times to many users (Diffie 
& Hellman, 1976.)” 
The ability to transmit the secret key through a public channel greatly increases the 
ability of multiple users or networks to initiate secure communications without having to 
safeguard their identifiable public key.  The Diffie-Hellman key exchange provides for 
different key sizes during the exchange, so that the level of encryption can be adjusted to 
an organizations needs. 
An IPSec (IP Security, RFCs 2402 through 2412) VPN uses the Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange in both phases of its connection.  Phase one of the key exchange (Internet 
Key Exchange, or IKE, or ISAKMP) uses Diffie-Hellman to authenticate each peer 
communicating with IPSec.  Phase two of IKE can use the Diffie-Hellman method to 
generate a new secret key each time the security association between two IPSec peers 
expires.  The secret key is combined with a random number and sent between the two 
peers.  The peers then verify each other’s key and a hash based on the sender’s public key 
to re-establish the IPSec security association.  This process when used in IKE Phase two 
is known as Perfect Forward Secrecy.  (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc2409.txt) 
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Alan Harbitter and Daniel Menascé write in their article A Methodology for 
Analyzing the Performance of Authentication Protocols that, “The computational 
requirements of public key cryptography are significantly higher than those of secret key 
cryptography. As a result, the substitution of public key encryption algorithms for secret 
key algorithms impacts performance.” (2002) This indicates that a VPN using a public 
key exchange can possibly suffer more of a performance hit that one that uses a secret 
key exchange.  Since this experiment uses an IPSec VPN, the predominant algorithm is 
secret key in that DES or 3DES use the same shared key to both encrypt and decrypt the 
data packets.  These processes use symmetric or Private Key Cryptography.  The initial 
key exchange however does use a public key algorithm to ensure that each IPSec peer 
can authenticate to the other without having to transmit the secret key across an insecure 
channel.  This would mean that a VPN would likely suffer more performance when using 
a Public Key method as opposed to a private key method.  Since the IPSec VPN uses 
both, the performance drop should occur during the Diffie-Hellman public key exchange, 
which occurs during both the initial key exchange for Phase I and optionally during the 
IPSec security association negotiation.   
Roger Needham and Michael Schroeder proffered a similar theory in their article 
entitled Using Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of Computers, in which 
they write, 
 
“We conclude from this study that protocols using public-key 
cryptosystems and using conventional encryption algorithms are strikingly 
similar. The number of protocol messages exchanged is very comparable, 
the public-key system having a noticeable advantage only in the case of 
signed communications. As in many network applications of computers, 
caching is important to reduce transactions with lookup servers; this is 
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particularly so with the public-key system. In that system we noticed also 
that there was a requirement for encryption of public data (the 
authentication server's database) in order to ensure its integrity.” (1978) 
 
IPSec’s attempt at offering a caching mechanism to speed up the cryptographic 
transactions occurs on each peer in the security association database.  
(http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2408.html) It is interesting however that they propose that 
the performance with encryption lies heavily in the amount of transactions that occur.  
This idea seems to indicate that a methodology (like Perfect Forward Secrecy) that uses 
numerous transactions in the cryptographic process will demand higher performance than 
those with fewer and/or cached transactions.  This is supported by the fact Perfect 
Forward Secrecy uses the Diffie-Hellman public key exchange, which Harbitter and 
Menascé have proposed already uses more CPU than a simple symmetric private key 
exchange.  Given a router with limited CPU resources, its ability to process data packets 
can be impacted, thereby reducing throughput and lowering overall network performance. 
 
VPN and Encryption Performance Test 
 
Since it is clear that only a VPN connection can satisfy the most rudimentary assumptions 
as delineated above, the question then becomes how should the VPN be implemented.  
There are numerous factors that can influence network and VPN tunnel performance.  
The type of layer two connectivity and the default packet or frame size can affect how 
much data can pass through a tunnel in a given time.  The amount of data that can pass 
through a network is called throughput, and is measured here in Kilobits per second 
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(Kb/s).  Throughput can also be affected by the amount of traffic that is already on a 
network or the number of connections that either the sender, the intermediary network 
equipment (routers, switches, VPN concentrators, etc.), or the destination have open. 
Also, the speed of the encryption and decryption heavily depend on the way the VPN 
vendor has implemented the algorithm and how much processing power the VPN 
participants have.  Obviously, the more expensive cryptographic accelerators can process 
encrypted packets much faster than a device that is trying to handle all of its encryption 
using software, or a less sophisticated acceleration hardware module.  Therefore it is 
difficult to accurately measure the performance of a VPN in an actual business setting as 
opposed to a lab environment.  However performance can be measured on a baseline 
network and can be used to determine a ratio of throughput to latency using different 
crypto methods.   
To measure the difference in throughput between several common encryption 
algorithms and technologies, I set up a lab network that has a LAN to LAN VPN tunnel 
configured so that devices in the 10.10.10.0/24 network can securely communicate with 
devices through the “Internet” (actually a 100 Mb/s switch) on the internal side of the 
remote router using the 20.20.20.0/24 network.  I used two Cisco 831 routers with 
hardware accelerator cards as the VPN tunnel endpoints.  Because I was using these 
Cisco routers, I was able to use the inherent VPN tunnel capabilities in their 
Internetworking Operating System (IOS), version C831 Software (C831-K9O3Y6-M), 
Version 12.3(8)T, RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc2)i.  
To measure performance I used the NetPerfii benchmarking software.  From their 
website, “Netperf is a benchmark that can be used to measure the performance of many 
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different types of networking. It provides tests for both unidirectional throughput, and 
end-to-end latency. The environments currently measurable by Netperf include: 
 
• TCP and UDP via BSD Sockets 
• DLPI 
• Unix Domain Sockets 
• Fore ATM API 
• HP HiPPI Link Level Access” 
 
For this experiment, I used only the TCP tests because they require the use of the 3-way 
handshake, and because most common applications (e-mail, http, instant messaging, etc.) 
use TCP.   Netperf.org indicate, “The most common use of Netperf is measuring bulk 
data transfer performance. This is also referred to as "stream" or "unidirectional stream" 
performance. Essentially, these tests will measure how fast one system can send data to 
another and/or how fast that other system can receive it.”  This is the configuration that I 
used to determine the throughput between the two different networks. 
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For the first test, I invoked Netperf to make a connection to the Netperf server running on 
20.20.20.2 that lasts for 30 seconds and is measured in Kilobits: netperf -f K -l 30 -H 
20.20.20.2 
 
I did ten TCP stream tests across the VPN tunnel for each of the following crypto 
configurations: 
 
• 3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with single DES packet encryption and 
SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing,  
• 3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with 3DES packet encryption and SHA-1 
(Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing 
• 3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with single DES packet encryption and 
SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing and Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) 
group 1 
• 3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with 3DES packet encryption and SHA-1 
(Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing and Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) group 1 
 
I averaged the throughput for the ten tests since there were slight differences in the 
performance between the different benchmarks.  This is likely the result of “ambient” 
network traffic, like ARP requests or other broadcast traffic occurring either through my 
simulated “Internet” or between the VPN tunnel itself. 
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Configuration 
Average 
Throughput 
(Kb/s) 
3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with single DES packet 
encryption and SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing 674.868 
3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with 3DES packet 
encryption and SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing 677.003 
3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with single DES packet 
encryption and SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing and 
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) group 1 
683.22 
3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with 3DES packet 
encryption and SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing and 
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) group 1 
684.797 
Table 2 
 
 
Per Table 2 above, it is clear that there is little change in throughput between the different 
algorithms.  Based on this test alone, in fact it appears as if throughput actually improves 
with the addition of more complex crypto algorithms and options.  Given that the strength 
of 3DES is exponentially stronger than the strength of a single DES key, the throughput 
should have decreased given the extra processing power required by the routers at the 
VPN tunnel endpoints. 
This could likely indicate that although there is a large difference between the 
cryptography strengths of DES and 3DES, the endpoint routers can handle the encryption 
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and decryption of the incoming packets without substantial impact to their performance, 
or the fact that symmetric encryption is a much less CPU intensive process.   
However it is possible that once the initial keys are sent, and security association 
is agreed upon and formed, the tunnel is up and there are no exhaustive crypto processes 
occurring on the routers other than the simple encryption/decryption of the packets.  
Since the routers are using the same secret key during the Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
process which only uses 3DES in this scenario, there are no further calculations required 
for the key exchange protocol (ISAKMP).   
Even using Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) the change in throughput was not 
significant and was in fact contrary to the hypothesis.  However, per the IPSec RFC 
(2408) the default lifetime for the IPSec security association lifetime is one hour, so to 
force the routers to re-negotiate their security associations, I set the lifetime to the 
minimum allowed of 120 seconds and ran my benchmark with Netperf for ten minutes.  
That would make it possible that the two endpoints could have to re-negotiate their 
associations up to five times during the test.  A thirty-second test like in the first 
experiment would never experience the security association re-negotiation and therefore 
would never really take advantage of the extra security provided by PFS. 
After decreasing the security association lifetime to 120 seconds, I then ran the 
following tests for ten minutes each: 
 
• 3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with single DES packet encryption and 
SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing,  
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• 3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with 3DES packet encryption and SHA-1 
(Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing 
• 3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with single DES packet encryption and 
SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing and Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) 
group 2 
• 3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with 3DES packet encryption and SHA-1 
(Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing and Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) group 2 
 
 
I then received the following results (Table 3): 
Configuration 
Average 
Throughput 
(Kb/s) 
3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with single DES packet 
encryption and SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing 676.18 
3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with 3DES packet 
encryption and SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing 669.94 
3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with single DES packet 
encryption and SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing and 
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) group 1 
661.57 
3DES Diffie-Hellman group 2 ISAKMP with 3DES packet 
encryption and SHA-1 (Secure Hashing Algorithm) hashing and 
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) group 1 
663.11 
Table 3 
 
Although not drastically different, enabling PFS did decrease the throughput of the VPN 
tunnel for both DES and for 3DES.  However, in a real global business scenario this 
slight performance loss can be amplified by numerous factors including the impact of 
other network traffic either flowing through the channel media or being processed by the 
 31
same router that serves as the VPN endpoint.  In this test scenario, the router’s only 
functions were to provide a secure VPN tunnel between two networks.  Other than the 
aforementioned ambient network traffic, there are no other factors that would have 
detracted from the performance of the routers and the encryption in the VPN tunnel.  
There are several other IPSec configuration options, yet they are all cryptographically 
weaker than the ones tested in the experiment.  Since the goal was to determine the 
performance impact of adding layers of security, it can be assumed that less effective 
types of cryptography and less options would allow for more network throughput.  
Testing with DES and 3DES along with PFS and the SHA-1-HMAC hashing algorithm 
provide the most secure configurations available for the IPSec VPN implementation in 
the Cisco IOS.  Other available configuration options are simply permutations of the ones 
already tested, though without one or more than one component.   
 
 
Making the right choice 
 
While the experiment did not indicate a radical difference between the different 
encryption algorithms and technologies, the slight difference that it did show can be used 
to project how much performance impact could occur on a live and production network.  
If the two VPN endpoints were at two distant geographic sites, or the traffic was traveling 
through a high latency medium like a satellite transmission, the overhead of encryption, 
decryption, and the re-keying of the security associations from PFS could reduce the 
throughput and subsequent productivity of the remote information worker.   
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Since a VPN provides confidentiality through its ESP level encryption (DES or 
3DES), integrity through its encryption and hashing (SHA-1), and non-repudiation 
through its symmetric shared key and hash combination (HMAC), the VPN technology is 
an obvious choice for secure remote access.  The question then stands as how to invest or 
configure the VPN network.  The experiment indicates that higher levels of encryption, 
and the addition of re-keying cycles can detract from the total average throughput by 
adding network latency through increased CPU time in the endpoint devices.  Therefore a 
business with a need for ultra fast remote and secure communications will need to either 
accept the added latency for the overhead of encryption and PFS, or forego the added 
protections of PFS and have a faster throughput.   
Although this experiment focused on the performance of IPSec, it only 
encompassed the protocol measurements using Cisco end devices.  There are numerous 
vendors that sell IPSec capable products that can accomplish the same end-to-end 
encryption tasks.  However to remain standards compliant, the differences between 
vendors can only be a factor in their implementation of hardware or their proprietary 
software efficiency.  To run IPSec and to allow customers to configure their tunnels using 
the options available in the IPSec standards and proposed standards, the vendors must 
include all the features available.  The level of complexity and the amount of options 
should be considered when deciding on a remote access methodology.  While IPSec is 
the de facto standard for secure connectivity, it can be highly complex and cumbersome 
to implement, particularly given a diverse and large network.  Scalability is a huge factor 
for large organizations that need a solution that can encompass their entire enterprise.  
 33
The more devices in a network, the more time will be spent configuring them for IPSec 
services.  Niels Ferguson and Bruce Schneier write,  
A more complex system loses on all fronts. It contains more weaknesses 
to start with, it is much harder to analyze, and it is much harder to 
implement without introducing security-critical errors in the 
implementation. 
 
This increase in the number of security weaknesses interacts destructively 
with the weakest-link property of security: the security of the overall 
system is limited by the security of its weakest link. Any single weakness 
can destroy the security of the entire system. 
 
Complexity not only makes it virtually impossible to create a secure 
system, it also makes the system extremely hard to manage. The people 
running the actual system typically do not have a thorough understanding 
of the system and the security issues involved. Configuration options 
should therefore be kept to a minimum, and the options should provide a 
very simple model to the user. Complex combinations of options are very 
likely to be configured erroneously, which results in a loss of security. 
(2000) 
 
Finding the balance between security and usability are at the heart of the decision 
for an IT organizations management and technology teams.  The context of the business 
communication dictates the need for greater security or greater network speed.  Better 
and more expensive technology cannot overcome their mutual exclusivity, but can only 
lessen the gap between the two.  Intermediary factors also play a huge role in the secure 
remote communication dichotomy between performance and security in collusion with 
the administrative overhead and potential oversight that comes with a complex protocol 
implementation.  The organization must ultimately choose based on the context of their 
business needs and availability of capital budget for a technology investment.  
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